Auction Theory

Time I: 
Friday, 01:45pm

More information on how to participate in the online course is provided in TU Berlin's ISIS portal. The first lecture will be on April 21. The time slots for lectures and sessions remain as scheduled.

The course will provide an introduction to the core concepts of auction theory. The learning experience will be enriched with case studies from auctions in the lab and in the field. Successful participants can solve optimal-bidding problems in standard auction forms, using advanced mathematical techniques. They first model the informational environment in a given application, using probability theory, and, second, use optimization theory to find optimal bidding strategies. Insights from mechanism design will enable them to design and solve novel auction formats. They learn to model both roles in seller-buyer environments.

Optimal bidding in single-unit auctions with symmetric independent private values: First-price auctions, second-price auctions, all-pay auctions; the revenue-equivalence theorem; risk-averse bidders; asymmetric bidders; optimal auctions and mechanism design; interdependent values, multi-unit auctions. 


There will be a 90-minutes exam at the end of the course that students need to pass. In addition, PhD students are required to either write a short term paper presenting an own research idea that is related to the topic of the course or present in class a recent (working/discussion) paper related to the course. In the presentation, the paper’s contribution to the literature has to be evaluated critically. The course will be successfully completed if the exam and the term paper/presentation are each graded with 4.0 or better. The final grade for the course will be the average of the two grades.


The class is mainly based on Vijay Krishna - Auction Theory, Academic Press, 2009

Spring 2020
Technische Universität Berlin