Please check with the BSE Handbook which mandatory courses you have to choose in your PhD track. Not all courses listed here can be approved as Core Courses for all BSE PhD tracks.

Monday, 12:00pm to Friday, 12:00am at Humboldt-Universität, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Spandauer Strasse 1, 10178 Berlin

July 6-10

Monday: 1 pm - 2 pm room 23 and 2.15 pm - 4 pm room 21a
Tuesday: 1 pm - 6 pm room 112
Wednesday: 1 pm - 6 pm room 112
Thursday: 1 pm - 6 pm room 117
Friday: 9 am - 2 pm room 21a

Spandauer Strasse 1.

This course will present a variety of models of choice behavior in single person decision problems and in games where the behavior is influenced by bounds on agents ability to reason and to remember. The course will consist of lectures only. I shall assign short problem sets to students. Students will receive a grade on the basis of their class participation and on the basis of their homeworks. Below is a preliminary list of topics and papers that will be covered.

1. Limited Logical Reasoning Abilities
(a) Robert Aumann, Interactive Epistemology I: Knowledge, International Journal of Game Theory 28 (1999), 263-300.
(b) Robert Aumann, Interactive Epistemology II: Probability, International Journal of Game Theory 28 (1999), 301-314.

2. Limited Awareness
(a) Salvatore Modica and Aldo Rustichini, Unawareness and Partitional Information Structures, Games and Economic Behavior 27 (1999), 265-298.
(b) Eddie Dekel, Barton Lipman and Aldo Rustichini, Standard State Spaces Preclude Unawareness, Econometrica 66 (1998), 159-173.
(c) Oliver Board and Kim-Sau Chung, Object-Based Unawareness: Theory and Applications.

3. Limited Strategic Thinking
(a) Dale O. Stahl and Paul W. Wilson, On Players’ Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence, Games and Economic Behavior 10 (1995), 218-254.
(b) Vincent P. Crawford, Miguel A. Costa-Gomes, and Nagore Iriberri, Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications, Journal of Economic Literature 51 (2013), 5-62.

4. Limited Foresight
(a) Philippe Jehiel, Limited Foresight May Force Cooperation, Review of Economic Studies 68 (2001), 369-391.1
(b) Shaowei Ke, Boundedly Rational Backward Induction, Job Market Paper, Princeton, 2015.

5. Bounded Memory
(a) Michele Piccione and Ariel Rubinstein, On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall, Games and Economic Behavior 20 (1997), 3-24.
(b) Tilman Börgers and Antonio Morales, Complexity Constraints in Two-Armed Bandit Problems: An Example.

6. Limited Attention
(a) Christopher Sims, Implications of Rational Inattention, Journal of Monetary Economics 50 (2003), 665-690.
(b) Andrew Ellis, Foundations for Optimal Inattention.

7. Strategies of Limited Complexity
(a) Dilip Abreu and Ariel Rubinstein, The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games With Finite Automata, Econometrica 56 (1998), 1259-1281.

8. The Design of Simple Mechanisms
(a) Gabriel Carroll, Robustness and Linear Contracts, American Economics Review 105 (2015), 536-563.
(b) Jacques Crémer and Michael Riordan, A Sequential Solution to the Public Goods Problem, Econometrica 53 (1985), 77-84.
(c) Liad Blumrosen, Noam Nisan and Ilya Segal, Auctions With Severely Bounded Communication, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 28 (2007), 233-266.
(d) Qinggong Wu, Coarse Communication and Voting.

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Monday, 10:00pm at Humboldt-Universität, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Spandauer Strasse 1, 10178 Berlin

The RTG 1659 invites you from April 13 to 17 to the following short course:

The aim of the course is to study models with heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets in macroeconomics, and to learn how to solve these models
We will discuss some classical and some very recent papers on heterogenous agent models. I will provide software tools (my own toolkit and some Matlab programs) that should make the solution of these models as easy as possible.
Some prior experience in programming (in Matlab or some other programming language) would be very useful.

Mo: 10-12 (room 21A) + 14-16 (room 203)
Tue: 10-14 (room 21A)
Wed: 14-18 (room 21A)
Thu: 10-12 (room 21A) + 16-18 (room 125)
Fr: 10-12 (room 125)

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Tuesday, 09:00am to 12:00pm at ESMT, Forum

The workshop will consist of a two-hour lecture, followed by a one-hour case study.

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Thursday, 04:00pm at Humboldt-Universität, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Spandauer Strasse 1, 10178 Berlin

May 21: 5 (sharp) to 8 pm (room 112)
May 22: 9 am to 4 pm (room 112)
May 27: 12 to 6 pm (room 21a)
May 28: cancelled!

We will provide an overview of dynamic games (repeated games and stochastic games, with or without private information). Within the context of discrete-time dynamic games with discounting (both qualifications to be understood throughout), we will survey all topics, with a focus on recent advances obtained in the last twenty years.

Topics will include, in the following order:

1. Repeated games with Imperfect Monitoring (RGIM)
(a) Perfect Monitoring
(b) Imperfect Public Monitoring
(c) Imperfect Private Monitoring

2. Repeated Games with Incomplete Information (RGII)
(a) Symmetric Learning
(b) Private Information
i. Strategic Types (Reputations)
ii. General Payoff Types

3. Stochastic Games

4. Repeated Bayesian Games

The lectures will be based on lecture notes, which supplement readings of relevant papers.
An extensive bibliography will be provided at the end of each set of lecture notes. The focus will
be on recent results and open problems.

Nonetheless, there are two excellent textbooks one might like to consult for repeated games
and related topics, namely:

Mailath, G., and L. Samuelson (2006). Repeated Games and Reputations, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Mertens, J.-F., S. Sorin and S. Zamir (2015). Repeated Games, forthcoming, Cambridge University Press. A (almost final) version is still available at

This course is co-financed by SFB 649 "Economic Risk".

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Thursday, 02:00pm at SPA1, R201

This course teaches new developments in the field of monetary economics. We start by a refresher on the dynamic New Keynesian model that is at center stage in the course "Monetary Economics". We then continue with analyses of indeterminacy and welfare. In each case we will put particular emphasis on the role played by features that make New
Keynesian theory attractive from an empirical point of view. We will also develop the techniques that are necessary to work with those concepts. In the second part of the course we will discuss some recent extensions of the New Keynesian model. Examples include models with labor market frictions, open economy models as well as models with financial
frictions. Those features are empirically motivated and their presence also has important normative implications, as we are going to see.

Galí, Jordi (2008): Monetary Policy, Inflation and the Business Cycle,
Princeton University Press. More documents will be made available on moodle.

Exam: 90 minutes

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Wednesday, 12:30pm at SPA1, Raum 23

April 15: Falk Mazelis

April 22: Christian Ochsner (Ifo Dresden): Political uncertainty and its long-run spatial effects - Expected loss of market access along the temporary intra-Austrian border

April 29: BDPEMS/RTG

May 06: tbd


May 20: tbd

May 27: canceled due to Humboldt Forum Wirtschaft

June 03: tbd

June 10: BDPEMS/RTG slot

June 17: tbd

June 24: BDPEMS/RTG slot

July 01: Johanna Krenz

July 08: BDPEMS/RTG slot

July 15: tbd


For further information and registration:

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Monday, 02:15pm to 03:45pm at R 23, Spandauer Str. 1

The Economic Risk Seminar is one of three regular research seminars hosted by the Sonderforschungsbereich 649. The SFB-649 facilitates an exchange between national and international scientists. The Economic Risk Seminar covers a wide spectrum of topics with some focus on the quantitative analysis of financial markets. During semester the seminar takes place regularly on Mondays between 2 and 4pm in room 23 at the School of Business and Economics of the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin at Spandauer Straße 1. The talks are held in English or German.

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Thursday (All day) at DIW, Gustav SCHMOLLER room (1.2.026)
Friday (All day) at DIW, Gustav SCHMOLLER room (1.2.026)

This workshop of Prof. Eizenberg will be completed in two sessions, during the 28. and 29. May 2015.
The exact time is yet to be announced.

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Wednesday, 09:30am at Humboldt-Universität, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Spandauer Strasse 1, 10178 Berlin

This course will be splitted in two Parts.
Part I will take place from 22-24 of July and Part II will take place on 2-3 of September. Students will be required to hand in a research project by August 31.

July 22-24: 9:30 - 12:30 and 14:00 - 15:00 room 21a in Spandauer Strasse 1

Course Description:

Many economists spend much of their lives in front of a computer, analysing data or simulating economic models. Surprisingly few of them have ever been taught how to do this well.
Class exposure to programming languages is most often limited to mastering (Stata, Matlab, EViews, . . . ) just well enough in order to perform simple tasks like running a basic regression.
However, these skills do not scale up in a straightforward manner to handle complex projects such as a master's thesis, a research paper, or typical work in government or private business
settings. As a result, economists spend their time wrestling with software, instead of doing work, but have no idea how reliable or effcient their programs are.
This course is designed to help full in this gap. It is aimed at PhD students who expect to write their theses in a eld that requires modest to heavy use of computations. Examples
include applied microeconomics, econometrics, macroeconomics, computational economics - any field that either involves real-world data; or that does not generally lead to models with
simple closed-form solutions.
We will introduce students to programming methods that will substantially reduce their time spent programming while at the same time making their programs more dependable and their results reproducible without extra effort. The course draws extensively on some simple techniques that are the backbone of modern software development, which most economists are simply not aware of. It shows the usefulness of these techniques for a wide variety of economic and econometric applications by means of hands-on examples. More information can be found on

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Wednesday, 09:00am to 01:00pm at ESMT, Schlossplatz 1
Friday, 09:00am to 01:00pm at ESMT, Schlossplatz 1


Course dates: April 15, 17, 22, 24, 29 and May 06, 08, 13, 15, 20, 22(tbc), 27, 29 and June 3(tbc)
Time: 9:00 – 13:00.

This course familiarizes students with classic questions and models in industrial organization. We first cover basic models of static as well as dynamic competition with applications to competitive strategy, mergers, collusion, managerial incentives, and trade policy. The course then analyzes in depth competitive strategies of vertical relations and control (B to B contracting) and introduces the extensive literature on two-sided markets. We also briefly discuss research on pricing when consumers violate classic assumptions on consumer behavior, e.g. erroneously analyze prices or contract offers.

Course prerequisites: Students must have completed the first-year microeconomics sequence in the BDPEMS.

Grading/exams: The exact course requirements will be discussed during the first lecture as they depend on how many students participate in the class.

We will prescribe numerous original research articles to read. Good textbooks on basic models of industrial organization are:
Tirole (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press.
Belleflamme and Peitz (2009), Industrial Organization: Markets and Strategies
The following textbook introduces questions of antitrust and economic models of competition that have been written to answer them:
Motta (2004), Competition Policy: Theory and Practice
The following textbook highlights implications of various consumer biases on market outcomes:
Spiegler, Ran (2011), Bounded Rationality and Industrial Organization

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Monday, 12:00pm to 04:00pm at ESMT, Schlossplatz 1, Room 00.17
Monday, 12:00pm to 04:00pm at FU Berlin, Boltzmannstr. 20, Room HS 328
Monday, 12:00pm to 04:00pm at HU Berlin, Spandauerstr. 1, Room 203

Paul Heidhues - ESMT, Schlossplatz 1, Room 00.17 (April 13 to May 4, 2015)
Helmut Bester - FU, Boltzmannstr. 20, Room HS 328 (May 11 to June 8, 2015 - no class on May 25)
Roland Strausz - HU, Spandauerstr. 1, Room 203 (June 15 to July 13, 2015)

Description of the course:
This course is devoted to market failures and welfare economics. The first part focuses on the three classical conditions under which market outcomes lead to an inefficient allocation of resources: externalities, imperfect competition and asymmetric information. It addresses these questions both from a positive and normative perspective. The second part addresses fundamental issues of welfare economics from the perspective of a policy maker who designs and implements collective decisions. It focuses in particular on social choice theory, the foundations of bargaining and welfare economics, and mechanism design. The intention of the course is to familiarize students with the standard tools of modern economic theory and to train them in applying these tools to actual economic problems.

Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995), Microeconomic Theory, Part III and Part V

Final Exam (13.07.2015)

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at DIW Mohrenstr. 58, Friedensburg Room (2.2.008)

Course dates: April 20, 22, May 5 and July 2, 3.
Time: 10:00 – 13:00.

The seminar deals with changes and new developments in the theoretical and empirical literature on monetary policy.
Topics covered through lectures and seminar papers include the following: the appropriate mandates and objective function of central banks, the relationship between monetary policy and financial supervision, the role of the exchange rates, the functioning of monetary policy in a monetary union, the importance of fiscal dominance, quantitative easing during financial crises, the role of communication of objectives and policies, the functioning of central bank committees, transparency and independence and accountability, global coordination of monetary policy, the international role of the euro and the US dollar.

The course will first start with a series of lectures addressing these various issues. The seminar participants are then asked to prepare a seminar paper on one of the issues, which then have to be presented and discussed towards the end of the semester.

To allow an intensive dialogue among the students, the seminar is organized in block classes. Many topics are closely related to each other.

The lectures will take place on 20 and 22 April and 5 May. The seminar presentations will take place on 2 and 3 July.
Location: DIW, Mohrenstr. 58, Friedensburg Room
Restriction to participation: 20
Registration: 13. to 18.04.2015 via e-mail to

Exam: Seminar paper (10 - 15 pages, 70 %) + presentation and discussion (30 %)

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Friday, 10:00am at HU Berlin, Spandauer Str. 1, Room 23

This course studies recent developments in the literature on “persuasion games”. The goal is to develop a good understanding of these games, their theoretical underpinning, and the underlying economic mechanisms which they capture and emphasize. In each session a course participant actively presents a specific research papers in this field for 45 to 60 minutes, pointing out and explaining its main contributions. In the remaining 45 to 30 minutes, all course participants jointly and actively discuss the relevance and the relation to the rest of this literature. Participants are expected to attend all the sessions and participate actively.

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Wednesday, 02:30pm to 05:30pm at DIW Berlin, Mohrenstr.58, Friedensburg Raum 22008

This course takes place on each Wednesday at DIW from May 13 to July 15, 14:30-17:30 o'clock. It discusses advantages and limitations of structural econometric models to give students an understanding of why and when adding structure is important. It also provides insights into strategy in important papers in structural Labor, Public and IO literature and establishes basic estimation techniques and numerical methods such as Simulation, Numerical integration and Discretisation. Besides of that, the course provides introduction to the matrix programming language MatLab.

Please note, that as of May 18th there is a new version of the syllabus uploaded.

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Friday, 10:00am at Technische Universität, mainbuilding, Straße des 17. Juni 135, room H0112

What is a causal effect and how can we identify and estimate a causal effect from nonexperimental data? These are among the most important questions in applied econometric research. This course will give an introduction and overview over the most important concepts and methods in this field, including the Rubin model of causality, the Roy model, statistical matching, instrumental variables, difference-in-differences methods, switching regression models, regression discontinuity design.

Time frame (date of first and last class): 17.4 - 17.7.2015

Time(s) and Location(s):
Lecture: Fr 10:00-12:00, room H0112 (TUB main building)
Tutorial: Fr 8:00-10:00, room H1028/TEL 206re

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Tuesday, 09:00am at Humboldt-Universität, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Spandauer Strasse 1, 10178 Berlin


June 2 and 3, 2015

June 2: 9 am - noon & 1:30 pm - 3 pm (Spandauer Strasse 1, room 112)
June 3: 9 am - noon & 2 pm - 3:30 pm (Spandauer Strasse 1, room 21a)


The objective of this course is to introduce students to dynamic games and their applications in economics, with an emphasis on industrial organization. During the course we will solve a simple version of the Ericson & Pakes (1995) model of industry dynamics and discuss how to extend it to capture key features of real-world industries. We will discuss some of the existing methods for computing equilibria of dynamic games and ways to alleviate the computational burden.

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