Courses

Please check with the BSE Handbook which mandatory courses you have to choose in your PhD track. Not all courses listed here can be approved as Core Courses for all BSE PhD tracks.

Instructor:
Description:

This course teaches new developments in the field of monetary economics. We start by a refresher on the dynamic New Keynesian model that is at center stage in the course "Monetary Economics". We then continue with analyses of indeterminacy and welfare. In each case we will put particular emphasis on the role played by features that make New Keynesian theory attractive from an empirical point of view. We will also develop the techniques that are necessary to work with those concepts. In the second part of the course we will discuss some recent extensions of the New Keynesian model. Examples include models with labor market frictions, open economy models as well as models with financial frictions. Those features are empirically motivated and their presence also has important normative implications, as we are going to see.

Literature:
Galí, Jordi (2008): Monetary Policy, Inflation and the Business Cycle, Princeton University Press.

Credits:
6.00
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Instructor:
Description:

This course covers: single unit auctions (private and common values) - role of risk aversion optimal auctions - affiliation - multi-unit auctions - sequential auctions -- applications. The course has three main objectives:
(i) Teach the mathematical methods of solving auction games and designing markets;
(ii) Review the main fields of the auctions literature and frontiers of current research;
(iii) Discuss practical experience (spectrum auctions, energy markets, take-over bidding, etc.).

Literature:
Vijai Krishna. Auction Theory. Academic Press 2002 and others

Credits:
6.00
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Description:

Bargaining is central to the working of the economy. This course is designed to introduce the major insights gained by the bargaining theory to students who will later develop, interpret or apply bargaining models in different fields within economics.

Literature:
Muthoo, A. (1999). Bargaining theory with applications. Cambridge Univ. Press
Osborne, M. J. & A. Rubinstein (1990). Bargaining and markets. Academic Press, San Diego and others

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Instructor:
Description:

This course on mathematics aims at refreshing basic mathematical knowledge essential for economic analysis. The course solely deals with deterministic mathematics. For some theorems formally rigorous proofs are presented in order to make participants more comfortable with - and ideally to provide some intuition for - constructing and understanding of mathematical proofs. Throughout the course proper use of notation will be stressed. It covers: sets, relations, preferences; vector spaces and linear algebra; topology and convex optimization; differential calculus.

Literature:
Schofeld, Norman. Mathematical Methods in Economics and Social Choice, Springer
de la Fuente, Angel. Mathematical Methods and Models for Economists, Cambridge University Press

Credits:
0.00
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Description:

The course reviews the main topics and models of the incentive theory. It focuses on the principal-agent paradigm where the principal delegates an action to a single agent through the take-it-or-leave-it offer of a contract. Major topics are represented by the problem of adverse selection, which occurs when the agent learns some piece of information relevant to the contractual relationship, and the problem of moral hazard, which appears as soon as the agent’s actions are not observable. First, the trade-offs that emerge in these contexts are characterized: the rent extraction-efficiency trade-off under adverse selection and the trade-offs between the extraction of limited liability rent and efficiency and also between insurance and efficiency under moral hazard. Then, extensions of the basic framework to more complex environments are discussed. Mixed models with adverse selection, moral hazard and nonverifiability of the state of the world are also treated.
Principal-agent models with adverse selection and moral hazard are finally considered in a dynamic context.

Literature:
Laffont/Martimore, "The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model", 2001
Bolton/Dewatripont, "Contract Theory", 2005
Salanié, "The Economics of Contracts", 2005
Macho-Stadler, Perez-Castrillo, "An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts", 2001
Mas-Colell, Whinston, Green, "Microeconomic Theory", 1995

Credits:
6.00
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