Courses

Please check with the BSE Handbook which mandatory courses you have to choose in your PhD track. Not all courses listed here can be approved as Core Courses for all BSE PhD tracks.

Instructor:
Description:

To attend this class students must have completed the core micro courses (Microeconomics 1 and 2).

This course presents psychological and experimental research in economics indicating departures from perfect rationality, self interest, and other classical assumptions of economics. To do so, a variety of empirical results are discussed. The course, however, focuses on different ways of how these departures from the standard assumptions can be formally modelled. It also discusses the implications of these formal behavioral model for positive and normative predictions in different institutional settings. The course has three aims: (i) familarizing students with the lively debate in experimental and behavioral economics; (ii) providing them with the methodological competence necessary to understand and judge original emprical research; (iii) provide formal tools for using so-called behavioral approaches in other areas of economics.

Literature:

There is no standard textbook in behavioral economics and the course is not based on a given textbook. Instead, students are expected to read original papers. Nevertheless, a good starting point is: Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky. Choices, Values and Frames, New York: Russell Sage Foundation; Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Credits:
6.00
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Instructor:
Description:

This seminar is a research-oriented introduction to experimental economics. The topics of the seminar change every year, and are for example based on recent contributions to market design or contract theory. In the first part of the course, a number of lectures will provide an introduction to the topic with a focus on theory. In a (shorter) second part, the participants will learn how conduct an experiment, e.g. how to recruit participants, how to pay them for their participation, how to run the experiment itself (e.g. with computers or paper-and-pencil), how to analyze the data. The main focus in this part will be on how to design an experiment that addresses the research question in the most effective way. In the last part, participants develop an experimental design, and conduct the experiment at a small scale in order to analyze the data. Students present their findings both in a talk and in a paper.

Credits:
6.00
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Instructor:
Description:

This course familiarizes students with classic questions and models in industrial organization. We first cover basic models of static as well as dynamic competition with applications to competitive strategy, mergers, collusion, managerial incentives, and trade policy. The course then analyzes in depth competitive strategies of vertical relations and control (B to B contracting) and introduces the extensive literature on two-sided markets. We also briefly discuss research on pricing when consumers violate classic assumptions on consumer behavior, e.g. erroneously analyze prices or contract offers.

Course prerequisites: Students must have completed the first-year microeconomics sequence in the BDPEMS.

Credits:
9.00
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Instructor:
Description:

This course offers students the possibility to learn about ongoing research in behavioral and experimental economics through seminar presentations from external scholars. Students who want to take this course for credit need to write three referee reports per semester selected from the list of papers that are presented and hand these in three days before the seminar. In addition, they need to attend both semi-annual internal all-day workshops and present own original research in at least one of these workshops.

Prerequisite:
Students should have taken a PhD-level class in behavioral or experimental economics.

Credits:
6.00
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Description:

The course reviews the main topics and models of the incentive theory. It focuses on the principal-agent paradigm where the principal delegates an action to a single agent through the take-it-or-leave-it offer of a contract. Major topics are represented by the problem of adverse selection, which occurs when the agent learns some piece of information relevant to the contractual relationship, and the problem of moral hazard, which appears as soon as the agent’s actions are not observable. First, the trade-offs that emerge in these contexts are characterized: the rent extraction-efficiency trade-off under adverse selection and the trade-offs between the extraction of limited liability rent and efficiency and also between insurance and efficiency under moral hazard. Then, extensions of the basic framework to more complex environments are discussed. Mixed models with adverse selection, moral hazard and nonverifiability of the state of the world are also treated. Principal-agent models with adverse selection and moral hazard are finally considered in a dynamic context.

Credits:
6.00
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