21.05. - 27.05. Johannes Hörner (Yale University): Recent Advances in Dynamic Games

Guest Instructor: 
Johannes Hörner
Time I: 
Thursday, 04:00pm
Venue I: 
Humboldt-Universität, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Spandauer Strasse 1, 10178 Berlin
Description: 

May 21: 5 (sharp) to 8 pm (room 112)
May 22: 9 am to 4 pm (room 112)
May 27: 12 to 6 pm (room 21a)
May 28: cancelled!

We will provide an overview of dynamic games (repeated games and stochastic games, with or without private information). Within the context of discrete-time dynamic games with discounting (both qualifications to be understood throughout), we will survey all topics, with a focus on recent advances obtained in the last twenty years.

Topics will include, in the following order:

1. Repeated games with Imperfect Monitoring (RGIM)
(a) Perfect Monitoring
(b) Imperfect Public Monitoring
(c) Imperfect Private Monitoring

2. Repeated Games with Incomplete Information (RGII)
(a) Symmetric Learning
(b) Private Information
i. Strategic Types (Reputations)
ii. General Payoff Types

3. Stochastic Games

4. Repeated Bayesian Games

The lectures will be based on lecture notes, which supplement readings of relevant papers.
An extensive bibliography will be provided at the end of each set of lecture notes. The focus will
be on recent results and open problems.

Nonetheless, there are two excellent textbooks one might like to consult for repeated games
and related topics, namely:

Mailath, G., and L. Samuelson (2006). Repeated Games and Reputations, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Mertens, J.-F., S. Sorin and S. Zamir (2015). Repeated Games, forthcoming, Cambridge University Press. A (almost final) version is still available at www.ma.huji.ac.il/~zamir/documents/General.pdf

This course is co-financed by SFB 649 "Economic Risk".

Credits: 
4.00
Program: 
Semester: 
Spring 2015
End date of the whole course: 
Wednesday, May 27, 2015 - 6:00pm