Advanced Experimental Economics

Guest Instructor: 
Yves Breitmoser
Time I: 
Thursday,
04:00pm to 07:00pm
Venue I: 
SPA1, R23
Description: 

Advanced Experimental Economics introduces methods and models currently used in analyses of economic experiments. The focus will be on structural models used to estimate utility functions, depth of reasoning, and subject heterogeneity. The course covers the numerical and econometric methods required to conduct structural analyses and the current behavioral approaches to model utilities and beliefs. Methods and models are developed in relation to standard experimental games and code examples illustrate their application on actual data. The topics include the estimation of social preferences in non-strategic environments (such as dictator games), the estimation of beliefs in normal-form games of complete information (e.g. level-k and quantal response equilibrium), the estimation of preferences and beliefs in strategic games (such as ultimatum and public goods games), the estimation of beliefs and updating errors in games of incomplete information (such as auctions), and the estimation of strategies in repeated games.

For the first 10 weeks of the course, I cover the core material in lectures. Along the way, topics for term papers are assigned and the participants start working on their topics. The term papers will apply the discussed methods and models to analyze existing experimental data sets, e.g. by estimating preferences and beliefs. PhD students will write papers of about 15-20 pages length, Master students will write papers of about 8-10 pages length. In the concluding five weeks of the course, the participants present the results of their projects in the class.

- Literature:
M. J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein. A course in game theory, 1994. MIT Press.
C. F. Camerer. Behavioral game theory, 2003. Princeton University Press.
K. L. Judd. Numerical methods in economics, 1998. MIT Press.
K. Train. Discrete choice methods with simulation, 2009 (2nd edition). Cambridge University Press.
C. A. Holt. Markets, games and strategic behavior, 2006. Addison Wesley.

- Exam (written? If yes: One or two exam dates?): Term paper and presentation by the end of the course

Credits: 
9.00
Program: 
Semester: 
Fall 2016
Affiliation: 
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
End date of the whole course: 
Thursday, February 16, 2017 - 7:00pm