Markets with Indivisibilities: Core and Incentives

Guest Instructor: 
Lars Ehlers (Université de Montréal)
Time I: 
Wednesday,
03:00pm to 06:00pm
Time II: 
Friday,
01:00pm to 04:00pm
Venue I: 
WZB, Reichpietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin, room D118/119
Venue II: 
WZB, Reichpietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin, room B001
Description: 

This course introduces matching markets with indivisibilities: (1) Housing markets where each individual owns one house and the houses are reallocated; (2) House allocation where a set of (commonly owned) houses needs to be allocated to a set of agents; and (3) Two-sided matching where the set of agents is partitioned in two sets, workers and firms, and workers are matched to firms. In all these markets agents have strict (or weak) preferences over their possible matches and no monetary transfers are possible (or the monetary transfer is fixed like in entry-level medical markets). We will establish the key results from this literature and
recent developments regarding the existence of core allocations and the design of mechanisms satisfying desirable properties such as efficiency, individual rationality and strategy-proofness (=dominant strategy incentive compatibility). This course will be in the field of the 2012 Nobel Prize in Economics.

Principal Reading:
Sönmez, T., Ünver, U., 2009. "Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources," Working Paper.
https://ideas.repec.org/p/boc/bocoec/717.html

Additional Reading:
Roth, A., Sotomayor, M., 1990. "Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis" Cambridge University Press [Econometric Society Monograph].

Time and venue:
Wednesday, June 19, 2019, 15.00 - 18.00, WZB, Reichpietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin, room D118/119
Friday, June 21, 2019, 13.00 - 16.00, WZB, Reichpietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin, room B001

Credits: 
1.00
Program: 
Semester: 
Spring 2019
Affiliation: 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung
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