Matching Market Design

Guest Instructor: 
Morimitsu Kurino
Time I: 
02:00pm to 05:00pm
Venue I: 
WZB, Room D112/113

This is a Ph.D. level course on Matching Market Design. The aim of the course is to provide PhD
students with the core knowledge on the field so that they can immediately start their own (theoretical or
experimental) research projects. For this reason, I will cover the most important results and go over the
proofs line by line, which enables students to understand the latest papers in the field.
Market Design concerns the creation of a venue in which buyers and sellers can meet and a format
through which they can interact. There are several applications for which market design has been quite
fruitful, the most notable ones being auction design and matching markets. As one of the most important
functions of markets, matching focuses on who gets what, particularly when the scarce goods are indivisible
and heterogeneous: for exampple, who gets which job at which firm, which buyer transacts with which
seller, which student goes to which school, or which patient gets which transplantable organ. Matching
Market Design aims to design a desirable matching procedure based on reported preferences in terms of
incentive compatibility, efficiency, and fairness.

Grading Requirements:

1. Attendance (20%)
2. Weekly assignments (40%): There will be an homework assignment weekly. Basically it is to prove some results.
I strongly recommend students to work together with your classmates. If so, please write their names explicitly.
3. Presentation (20%): I will list up recent papers. A student is supposed to choose one of them and present it once.
4. Research proposal (20%): Every student needs to write a research proposal in Matching. It can be on theory or
experiments. Please discuss your ideas with me.

Fall 2013
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung
End date of the whole course: 
Tuesday, February 11, 2014 - 4:30pm