

DIRK BERGEMANN

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
YALE UNIVERSITY

Information and Mechanism Design: Theory and Applications

Short Course Berlin Graduate School
Spring 2012

Program. This short course provides an introduction into recent research in games of incomplete information and mechanism design. The focus of lecture is on the important role of private information for the design of mechanism, the analysis of strategic behavior, and the role in the provision of incentives in dynamic markets and markets for information. The lectures are centered on recent research, but will aim to provide a broad introduction into the basic themes and the current research agendas at large.

Lecture 1: Robust Mechanism Design

1. Bergemann and Morris (2005)
2. Bergemann and Morris (2009)
3. Bergemann and Morris (2012)

Lecture 2: Robust Prediction in Games with Incomplete Information

1. Bergemann and Morris (2011b)
2. Bergemann and Morris (2011a)

Lecture 3: Dynamic Mechanism Design: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization

1. Bergemann and Välimäki (2010)
2. Bergemann and Said (2011)
3. Bergemann and Hörner (2010)

Lecture 4: Information and Targeting

1. Bergemann and Bonatti (2011)

References

- BERGEMANN, D., AND A. BONATTI (2011): “Targeting in Advertising Markets: Implications for Offline Vs. Online Media,” *RAND Journal of Economics*, 42, 414–443.
- BERGEMANN, D., AND J. HÖRNER (2010): “Should Auctions Be Transparent?,” Discussion Paper 1764, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- BERGEMANN, D., AND S. MORRIS (2005): “Robust Mechanism Design,” *Econometrica*, 73, 1771–1813.
- (2009): “Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms,” *Review of Economic Studies*, 76, 1175–1206.
- (2011a): “Correlated Equilibrium in Games of Incomplete Information,” Discussion paper, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University and Princeton University.
- (2011b): “Robust Predictions in Games of Incomplete Information,” Discussion paper, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- (2012): *Robust Mechanism Design*. World Scientific Publishing, Singapore.
- BERGEMANN, D., AND M. SAID (2011): “Dynamic Auctions: A Survey,” in *Wiley Encyclopedia of Operations Research and Management Science*, ed. by J. Cochran, no. 1757, pp. 1511–1522. Wiley, New York.
- BERGEMANN, D., AND J. VÄLIMÄKI (2010): “The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism,” *Econometrica*, 78, 771–790.