Program. This short course provides an introduction into recent research in games of incomplete information and mechanism design. The focus of lecture is on the important role of private information for the design of mechanism, the analysis of strategic behavior, and the role in the provision of incentives in dynamic markets and markets for information. The lectures are centered on recent research, but will aim to provide a broad introduction into the basic themes and the current research agendas at large.

Lecture 1: Robust Mechanism Design
   1. Bergemann and Morris (2005)
   2. Bergemann and Morris (2009)

Lecture 2: Robust Prediction in Games with Incomplete Information
   1. Bergemann and Morris (2011b)
   2. Bergemann and Morris (2011a)

Lecture 3: Dynamic Mechanism Design: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization
   1. Bergemann and Välimäki (2010)
   2. Bergemann and Said (2011)

Lecture 4: Information and Targeting
   1. Bergemann and Bonatti (2011)
References


