

1. SYLLABUS AND READING LIST FOR “PH.D. WORKSHOP AT BERLIN”

1.1. Summary. Whether and how markets aggregate information that is dispersed among market participants has been a fundamental question in Economics, and dates back to Hayek. A similar question arises in the context of elections and informal political processes: Does the “wisdom of crowds” get incorporated in election outcomes, do surveys, polls and protests convey information held by the citizens to policy makers effectively? These questions have been “partially” answered in different setups, and there are still many related questions to be answered.

In this short course (3 lectures with 90 min each), I will go through some classical papers and some current papers (a few I am working on right now).

TOPICS, READINGS, AND PAPERS

1.2. Large Auctions and Information Aggregation.

- (i) A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding ([Milgrom \(1979\)](#))
- (ii) A theory of auctions and competitive bidding ([Milgrom and Weber \(1982\)](#))
- (iii) Rational expectations, information acquisition, and competitive bidding ([Milgrom \(1981\)](#))
- (iv) The loser’s curse and information aggregation in common value auctions ([Pesendorfer and Swinkels \(1997\)](#))

1.3. Condorcet Jury Theorems and Information Aggregation in Elections.

- (i) Information aggregation, rationality, and the Condorcet jury theorem ([Austen-Smith and Banks \(1996\)](#))
- (ii) Voting behavior and information aggregation in elections with private information ([Feddersen and Pesendorfer \(1997\)](#))
- (iii) Manipulated Electorates and Information Aggregation ([Ekmekci and Lauermann \(2014\)](#))

1.4. Informal Political Processes and Information Aggregation.

- (1) Public protests and policy making [Battaglini \(2017\)](#)
- (2) Costly Advice, Protests and Nonbinding Voting (by Ekmekci and Lauermann, Paper not present yet)

REFERENCES

- AUSTEN-SMITH, D. AND J. S. BANKS (1996): “Information aggregation, rationality, and the Condorcet jury theorem,” *American Political Science Review*, 90, 34–45.
- BATTAGLINI, M. (2017): “Public protests and policy making,” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 132, 485–549.
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- FEDDERSEN, T. AND W. PESENDORFER (1997): “Voting behavior and information aggregation in elections with private information,” *Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society*, 1029–1058.
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