Courses

Monday, 12:00pm to Friday, 12:00am
at Humboldt-Universität, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Spandauer Strasse 1, 10178 Berlin
Description:

July 6-10

Monday: 1 pm - 2 pm room 23 and 2.15 pm - 4 pm room 21a
Tuesday: 1 pm - 6 pm room 112
Wednesday: 1 pm - 6 pm room 112
Thursday: 1 pm - 6 pm room 117
Friday: 9 am - 2 pm room 21a

Spandauer Strasse 1.

This course will present a variety of models of choice behavior in single person decision problems and in games where the behavior is influenced by bounds on agents ability to reason and to remember. The course will consist of lectures only. I shall assign short problem sets to students. Students will receive a grade on the basis of their class participation and on the basis of their homeworks. Below is a preliminary list of topics and papers that will be covered.

1. Limited Logical Reasoning Abilities
(a) Robert Aumann, Interactive Epistemology I: Knowledge, International Journal of Game Theory 28 (1999), 263-300.
(b) Robert Aumann, Interactive Epistemology II: Probability, International Journal of Game Theory 28 (1999), 301-314.

2. Limited Awareness
(a) Salvatore Modica and Aldo Rustichini, Unawareness and Partitional Information Structures, Games and Economic Behavior 27 (1999), 265-298.
(b) Eddie Dekel, Barton Lipman and Aldo Rustichini, Standard State Spaces Preclude Unawareness, Econometrica 66 (1998), 159-173.
(c) Oliver Board and Kim-Sau Chung, Object-Based Unawareness: Theory and Applications.

3. Limited Strategic Thinking
(a) Dale O. Stahl and Paul W. Wilson, On Players’ Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence, Games and Economic Behavior 10 (1995), 218-254.
(b) Vincent P. Crawford, Miguel A. Costa-Gomes, and Nagore Iriberri, Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications, Journal of Economic Literature 51 (2013), 5-62.

4. Limited Foresight
(a) Philippe Jehiel, Limited Foresight May Force Cooperation, Review of Economic Studies 68 (2001), 369-391.1
(b) Shaowei Ke, Boundedly Rational Backward Induction, Job Market Paper, Princeton, 2015.

5. Bounded Memory
(a) Michele Piccione and Ariel Rubinstein, On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall, Games and Economic Behavior 20 (1997), 3-24.
(b) Tilman Börgers and Antonio Morales, Complexity Constraints in Two-Armed Bandit Problems: An Example.

6. Limited Attention
(a) Christopher Sims, Implications of Rational Inattention, Journal of Monetary Economics 50 (2003), 665-690.
(b) Andrew Ellis, Foundations for Optimal Inattention.

7. Strategies of Limited Complexity
(a) Dilip Abreu and Ariel Rubinstein, The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games With Finite Automata, Econometrica 56 (1998), 1259-1281.

8. The Design of Simple Mechanisms
(a) Gabriel Carroll, Robustness and Linear Contracts, American Economics Review 105 (2015), 536-563.
(b) Jacques Crémer and Michael Riordan, A Sequential Solution to the Public Goods Problem, Econometrica 53 (1985), 77-84.
(c) Liad Blumrosen, Noam Nisan and Ilya Segal, Auctions With Severely Bounded Communication, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 28 (2007), 233-266.
(d) Qinggong Wu, Coarse Communication and Voting.

Click here to get more information or to sign up
Monday, 10:00pm at Humboldt-Universität, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Spandauer Strasse 1, 10178 Berlin
Description:

The RTG 1659 invites you from April 13 to 17 to the following short course:

The aim of the course is to study models with heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets in macroeconomics, and to learn how to solve these models
numerically.
We will discuss some classical and some very recent papers on heterogenous agent models. I will provide software tools (my own toolkit and some Matlab programs) that should make the solution of these models as easy as possible.
Some prior experience in programming (in Matlab or some other programming language) would be very useful.

Mo: 10-12 (room 21A) + 14-16 (room 203)
Tue: 10-14 (room 21A)
Wed: 14-18 (room 21A)
Thu: 10-12 (room 21A) + 16-18 (room 125)
Fr: 10-12 (room 125)

Credits:
5.00
Click here to get more information or to sign up
Tuesday,
09:00am to 12:00pm
at ESMT, Forum
Description:

The workshop will consist of a two-hour lecture, followed by a one-hour case study.

Credits:
1.00
Click here to get more information or to sign up
Thursday, 04:00pm at Humboldt-Universität, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Spandauer Strasse 1, 10178 Berlin
Description:

May 21: 5 (sharp) to 8 pm (room 112)
May 22: 9 am to 4 pm (room 112)
May 27: 12 to 6 pm (room 21a)
May 28: cancelled!

We will provide an overview of dynamic games (repeated games and stochastic games, with or without private information). Within the context of discrete-time dynamic games with discounting (both qualifications to be understood throughout), we will survey all topics, with a focus on recent advances obtained in the last twenty years.

Topics will include, in the following order:

1. Repeated games with Imperfect Monitoring (RGIM)
(a) Perfect Monitoring
(b) Imperfect Public Monitoring
(c) Imperfect Private Monitoring

2. Repeated Games with Incomplete Information (RGII)
(a) Symmetric Learning
(b) Private Information
i. Strategic Types (Reputations)
ii. General Payoff Types

3. Stochastic Games

4. Repeated Bayesian Games

The lectures will be based on lecture notes, which supplement readings of relevant papers.
An extensive bibliography will be provided at the end of each set of lecture notes. The focus will
be on recent results and open problems.

Nonetheless, there are two excellent textbooks one might like to consult for repeated games
and related topics, namely:

Mailath, G., and L. Samuelson (2006). Repeated Games and Reputations, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Mertens, J.-F., S. Sorin and S. Zamir (2015). Repeated Games, forthcoming, Cambridge University Press. A (almost final) version is still available at www.ma.huji.ac.il/~zamir/documents/General.pdf

This course is co-financed by SFB 649 "Economic Risk".

Credits:
4.00
Click here to get more information or to sign up
Wednesday, 09:30am at Humboldt-Universität, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Spandauer Strasse 1, 10178 Berlin
Description:

This course will be splitted in two Parts.
Part I will take place from 22-24 of July and Part II will take place on 2-3 of September. Students will be required to hand in a research project by August 31.

July 22-24: 9:30 - 12:30 and 14:00 - 15:00 room 21a in Spandauer Strasse 1

Course Description:

Many economists spend much of their lives in front of a computer, analysing data or simulating economic models. Surprisingly few of them have ever been taught how to do this well.
Class exposure to programming languages is most often limited to mastering (Stata, Matlab, EViews, . . . ) just well enough in order to perform simple tasks like running a basic regression.
However, these skills do not scale up in a straightforward manner to handle complex projects such as a master's thesis, a research paper, or typical work in government or private business
settings. As a result, economists spend their time wrestling with software, instead of doing work, but have no idea how reliable or effcient their programs are.
This course is designed to help full in this gap. It is aimed at PhD students who expect to write their theses in a eld that requires modest to heavy use of computations. Examples
include applied microeconomics, econometrics, macroeconomics, computational economics - any field that either involves real-world data; or that does not generally lead to models with
simple closed-form solutions.
We will introduce students to programming methods that will substantially reduce their time spent programming while at the same time making their programs more dependable and their results reproducible without extra effort. The course draws extensively on some simple techniques that are the backbone of modern software development, which most economists are simply not aware of. It shows the usefulness of these techniques for a wide variety of economic and econometric applications by means of hands-on examples. More information can be found on http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/gaudecker/teaching.html.

Credits:
5.00
Click here to get more information or to sign up
Wednesday, 09:45am at Tagungshotel Schorfheide
Description:

The RTG Summer School 2015 takes place from August 5 to 13, 2015, at the "Ringhotel Schorfheide (Tagungszentrum der Wirtschaft)".

Apart from the students' presentations, it features two courses by:

I. Anne Beyer (Stanford University, http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/faculty/anne-beyer) - "Corporate Disclosures and Capital Markets"
II. Fabian Lange (McGill University, http://www.fabianlange.ca/) - "Empirical Personnel Economics"

Credits:
5.00
Click here to get more information or to sign up
Tuesday, 09:00am at Humboldt-Universität, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Spandauer Strasse 1, 10178 Berlin
Description:

DATE

June 2 and 3, 2015

June 2: 9 am - noon & 1:30 pm - 3 pm (Spandauer Strasse 1, room 112)
June 3: 9 am - noon & 2 pm - 3:30 pm (Spandauer Strasse 1, room 21a)

COURSE DESCRIPTION

The objective of this course is to introduce students to dynamic games and their applications in economics, with an emphasis on industrial organization. During the course we will solve a simple version of the Ericson & Pakes (1995) model of industry dynamics and discuss how to extend it to capture key features of real-world industries. We will discuss some of the existing methods for computing equilibria of dynamic games and ways to alleviate the computational burden.

Credits:
2.00
Click here to get more information or to sign up
Subscribe to Courses