Courses

Tuesday,
02:00pm to 04:00pm
at Dorotheenstr. 1, room 005
Description:

Upon completion of the course, students will be familiar with arguments and approaches in modern corporate finance theory, will be able to apply these in their own research, and will be able to critically evaluate current research in this area.

Literature: There is no single textbook. We will use selected parts of Jean Tirole, “The Theory of Corporate Finance,” as well as current and classic papers.

Exam: Take-home exam/ referee report

Credits:
6.00
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Instructor:
Friday,
02:00pm to 04:00pm
at HU, Dorotheenstraße 1, Room 204
Description:

The course aims at equipping you with the necessary background and skill-set to read, comprehend and evaluate current empirical work in the area of financial accounting research. It is aimed at second year PhD students and requires a sound background in economics and microeconometrics. In addition, students should have a general understanding of the institutions of capital markets in general and financial accounting in particular.

Teaching is organized in topical sessions. For each session, one participant is expected to take the lead, suggesting papers to discuss two weeks in advance and structure the discussion.

Dates:
2018: Oct 26, Nov 16, Dec 7
2019: Jan 11, Feb 1

Literature:
tba

Exam:
Students interested in obtaining 6 ECTS credits from this course are requested to hand in the following:

  • Two topic summaries (1,500 words not including references), handed in two weeks after the according class. These summaries should not be confined to the literature discussed in class and should include a discussion of potential avenues of future research.
  • A proposal for a potential research project (1,500 words not including references). This research project will be presented and discussed in the last session of the class. Ideally, this could be a kick-start for a part of your PhD work.

Grading will depend on the assignments (see above) and on class participation. All four components are given equal weights for the final grade.

Credits:
6.00
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Instructor:
Monday,
12:00pm to 04:00pm
at HU Berlin, Spandauer Straße 1, Room 22
Description:

This course provides an overview on the economic analysis of labor markets. The emphasis is on applied microeconomics and empirical analysis. Topics to be covered include: labor supply and demand, human capital, education and training, changes in the wages structure and inequality, biased technological change and returns to skills, organizational change and skill demand, the closing gender gap. The introduction of topics will be on textbook level, but the focus will be on the discussion of empirical implementation strategies used in recent publications.

Acquaintance of intermediate microeconomics or labor economics and econometrics is highly recommended.

Literature:
R. Ehrenberg and R. Smith, 2003, Modern Labor Economics,
P. Cahuc and A. Zylberberg, 2004, Labor Economics,
and selected journal articles

Exam:
Written exam (90 min)

Credits:
6.00
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Instructor:
Wednesday,
02:00pm to 04:00pm
at Freie Universität, Garystr. 21, lecture halle 104
Thursday,
10:00am to 12:00pm
at Freie Universität, Garystr. 21, K 006a PC Pool 1
Description:

The aim of the course is to teach students how to interpret empirical research in public economics and to apply modern econometric methods commonly used in the field. The course covers alternative empirical approaches and important topics in empirical public economics including non-structural (“treatment effects” estimation) and structural estimation methodologies as well as the empirical ex-ante evaluation of tax-benefit reforms. Lectures on empirical methods are supplemented by classes on the application of the various methods using STATA. The course assumes knowledge of applied microeconometrics.

Literature:
Blundell, R., M. Costa-Dias (2009): Alternative approaches to evaluation in empirical microeconomics. Journal of Human Resources 44, 565–640.
Aaberge, R., U. Columbino (2018): Structural labour supply models and microsimulation. IZA DP No. 11562.

Exam:
2 hours final exam; research paper on empirical topic in public/labour economics (may be part of the PhD thesis)

Credits:
6.00
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Tuesday,
08:30am to 10:00am
at HU, Spandauer Straße 1, Room 23
Tuesday,
02:15pm to 03:45pm
at HU, Spandauer Straße 1, Room 23
Description:

This course presents nonparametric and semiparametric regression techniques and modern microeconometric methods for treatment effects estimation. The treatment focuses on the potential outcome approach, and students learn various methods to account for selection based on observables (regression, matching, inverse probability weighting) and for selection based on unobservables (Heckman selection correction, difference-in-differences, panel regression, instrumental variable regression, regression discontinuity design). These methods are used for cross-section data and longitudinal data, both repeated cross-sections and panel data. Students will familiarize themselves with applying the methods to real empirical data using Stata.

Literature:
Angrist, J. D. and J.-S. Pischke (2009): Mostly Harmless Econometrics – An Empiricist’s Companion, Princeton University Press.
Pagan, A. and A. Ullah (1999): Nonparametric Econometrics, Cambridge University Press
Wooldridge, J. M. (2010): Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. 2nd edition, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press

Exam:
Written exam (to register for the exam, PhD students must present a research paper)

Credits:
6.00
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Tuesday,
02:00pm to 04:00pm
at HU, Spandauer Straße 1, Room 125
Description:

The lecture will cover the most important aspects of the European economic development from the turn of the 19th century to the outbreak of the First World War. Topics include the Industrial Revolution, population growth and migration, international trade, the Gold Standard, as well as the economics of nationalism, colonialism and war. In the tutorial, we will discuss key texts and important concepts.

Literature:
Broadberry, S.; O’Rourke, K. (eds.) (2010). The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe. Cambridge University Press.

Exam:
Written exam (90 min)

Credits:
6.00
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Instructor:
Tuesday,
04:00pm to 06:00pm
at Spandauer Straße 1, room 112
Description:

Abstract and Learning Objectives
Various robust deviations from rational decision making have been reported such as loss aversion, probability weighting, status quo bias, overconfidence etc. Understanding those deviations leads to a more realistic modelling of the behavior of different economic actors and to an increased prediction success. In this course, participants will understand those and other important deviations from rationality as well as their theoretical explanations/modelling, e.g., prospect theory and mental accounting. Most theories have been developed implementing psychological and economic experiments. Whereas psychological experiments are mostly asking the respondents for hypothetical choices, real decisions with actual monetary payoffs are implemented in economic experiments. Half of the course will be concerned with a profound introduction to the several deviations from rationality that have been reported with real decision makers and with the theoretical treatment of those deviations. The other half of the course will deal with different types of experiments and different experimental designs as well as the matching of research question and type of empirical method to be used.

Content
Whereas the first two days take the form of an interactive lecture and are mostly devoted to laying the basic knowledge in experimental research and behavioral decision theory, the next two days are devoted to specific applications of behavioral decision theory to selected topics in tax compliance, behavioral finance, behavioral insurance, entrepreneurial decisions, venture financing decisions, and consumer behavior. Whereas not all areas of business research are captured in the example studies, the applications are diverse as well as broad enough to have participants from different fields benefit from this course.

Selected Literature:
Friedman, D., Sunder, S. (1994): Experimental methods: A primer for economists. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK) and New York (USA).
Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P. M. and the ABC Research Group (1999): Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart. Oxford University Press, Oxford (UK).
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1979): Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica 47, 263-291.

More literature to be found in the syllabus.

Exam:
to be announced

Credits:
6.00
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Instructor:
Monday,
01:00pm to 03:00pm
at HU, Rudower Chaussee 26, 0.311
Thursday,
01:00pm to 03:00pm
at HU, Rudower Chaussee 26, 1.304
Monday,
03:00pm to 05:00pm
at HU, Rudower Chaussee 26, 1.304
Description:

The course is planned to be held in German. Upon request, the course can be held in English!

Zeitlich diskrete stochastische Finanzmarktmodelle und Analyse der entsprechenden martingaltheoretischen und funktionalanalytischen Methoden (Arbitragefreiheit und Martingalmaße, das Cox-Ross-Rubinstein Modell und die Black-Scholes Formel, optimales Stoppen und amerikanische Optionen, Risikomaße) sowie Einführung in zeitstetige Modelle und der pfadweise Ito-Kalkül.

Inhalt:
Einleitung
Ein-Perioden Modelle
Dynamische Absicherungsstrategien in diskreter Zeit
Das Cox-Ross-Rubinstein Modell
Optimalen Stoppen und Amerikanische Optionen
Risikomaße
Der pfadweise Ito-Kalkül
Das Bachelier Modell in stetiger Zeit

Prüfung:
je nach Teilnehmerzahl Klausur oder mündliche Prüfung

Credits:
6.00
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Description:

It is possible that you might not find all of the courses on this page. Please double-check also the Fall 2018 Course Catalogues of each institution:

HU
TU
FU
ESMT
DIW

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Instructor:
Friday, 03:30pm at DIW, Mohrenstraße 58, Karl Popper Room (2.3.020)
Description:

Researchers face the challenge to translate their academic results to policy makers and to the public. Often the results are derived using complex theoretical or empirical models, which are based on strong assumptions. Therefore, it is necessary to develop methods and skills, which allow to explain the models and the assumptions to policy makers and to derive results and policy conclusions based on the models.
This course provides an introduction to policy analysis and to evidence-based policy advice. The course addresses the following questions:
How to motivate the research and policy questions?
How to discuss the methods and assumptions used for the policy analysis?
How to discuss limitations of the research design?
How to present the results to policy makers?
How to derive policy conclusions?
During the course students will prepare a policy paper which should be ideally based on a paper of the dissertation. We will focus on oral and written presentations of the policy paper.

Prerequisites:
Students need to have an excellent background in theoretical and empirical methods (Required courses are: Econometrics I&II and two courses out of Micro I&II, Macro I&II or ManSci I&II.) They should have a clear idea of which field they want to write their dissertation in. Moreover, they should have already chosen their supervisor and a topic for a first paper of the dissertation. PhD students have the possibility to take the course in the 3rd or the 5th term.

Organization of the Course:
The course is interactive and applied. In the beginning, the students need to develop a research question with a clear policy focus. The question and the research design can be related to any field of economics. The research question is closely related to the first paper of the dissertation and should be developed in close cooperation with the supervisor.
At the same time, a course advisor from the pool of instructors will be matched with the students. The advisors provide guidance throughout the course and offer office hours.

There will be four class meetings with the following requirements (concrete dates are listed in the syllabus):
1. Introduction (mid October) – organization and example of policy briefing (Tomaso Duso and Peter Haan)
2. Abstract (200 words) of the research project that will be the basis for the policy paper (shortly after the first meeting, mid October). Based on this abstract we will match students to a course advisor.
3. Presentation of the research question (after 4 weeks – mid November)
Students have to hand in a two page description of the question, including a motivation of why the question is important for policy – specifically taking into account the debate relevant to their question – and which research design will be chosen. During the meeting students need to present their research question in 5 minutes.
4. Presentation of the method and assumptions (Mid-term) (after 2 months – mid December)
Mid-term paper: Students have to hand in a five-page description of the method and the assumptions and first preliminary results. During the meeting students need to present their mid-term paper in 7 minutes.
5. Presentation of the results and of the policy conclusions (after 4 months).
Students have to hand in a final 10 page policy paper including executive summary, motivation, method, results and policy conclusion. During the meeting students need to present their results in 10 minutes.

Related Literature:
Jayaraman, R. and J. Rocholl (2017): Research-based policy advice to the G20, G20 Insights, May 21. Available online at http://www.g20-insights.org/policy_briefs/research-based-policy-advice-g20/
Financial Stability Board (2017): Framework for Post-Implementation Evaluation of the Effects of the G20 Financial Regulatory Reforms. Available online at http://www.fsb.org/2017/07/framework-for-post-implementation-evaluation-...

Credits:
9.00
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Tuesday,
06:00pm to 08:00pm
at tba
Credits:
3.00
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Instructor:
Friday,
10:00am to 12:00pm
at HU Berlin, Spandauer Straße 1, Room 21b
Description:

Focusing on a specific topic within microeconomic theory, the seminar studies recent developments in the literature of mechanism design, contract theory, industrial organization, and organization theory. Students discuss and present related research papers, pointing out their interrelations and discussing their main contributions. The seminar puts a particular emphasis on understanding the theoretical underpinning behind the papers’ results and the economic mechanisms they capture. A major goal of the seminar is to find new open questions for future research. Participants are expected to attend all the sessions, read all the discussed papers beforehand, and participate actively in discussions.

Literature:
tba

Exam:
Presentations and oral participation

Credits:
6.00
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Instructor:
Wednesday,
09:00am to 11:00pm
at HU, Rudower Chaussee 26, 1.304
Thursday,
11:00am to 01:00pm
at HU, Rudower Chaussee 26, 3.006
Description:

The course is planned to be held in German. Upon request, the course can be held in English!

Mathematische Grundlagen der nichtkooperativen Spieltheorie (mengenwertige Abbildungen, Fixpunktsätze von Kakutani und Fan-Glicksberg, Key-Fan Theorem), Nash-Gleichgewichte in statischen und dynamischen Spielen, Spiele mit vollständiger und unvollständiger Information, Verhaltensstrategien und sequentielle Gleichgewichte in Markovschen Spielen.

Inhalt:
Statische Spiele: Spiele in Normalform, 2 Personen Nullsummenspiele, Mengenwertige Abbildungen und Fixpunkttheoreme (Schauder, Kakutani, Fan-Glicksberg)
Stochastische Spiele: Markovsche Spiele und Verhaltensstrategien, Gemischte Strategien und der Satz von Kuhn, Spiele mit unvollständiger Information, Sequentielle Gleichgewichte

Prüfung:
je nach Teilnehmerzahl Klausur oder mündliche Prüfung

Credits:
6.00
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Tuesday,
10:00am to 05:00pm
at HU, Spandauer Straße 1, Room 21 A
Description:

The Preparatory Math Course aims to equip students with the necessary math background for the first year (compulsory) economics graduate level courses. It is mainly meant to be a refresher of existing math knowledge. Please find a list of the topics that will be covered in the attached syllabus. Students who feel unfamiliar with some of these topics are encouraged to read up on them prior to the start of the course. A useful set of references is provided at the end of the syllabus. Please also note the attached timetable.

Please note that only on October 2, 2018, the course will be held at DIW, Schwartz Room.

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Instructor:
Tuesday,
10:00am to 02:00pm
at HU, Spandauer Str. 1, Room 23
Description:

Social or other-regarding preferences refer to preferences of economic agents regarding other people’s outcomes. These preferences can be both benevolent and malevolent, but crucially they differ from selfish preferences without any regard for others. The course provides an introduction to key evidence about the relevance of social preferences in economic interaction as well as the most important theoretical approaches that aim at explaining these results. Most of the discussed evidence will be from controlled laboratory experiments. Critique regarding the relevance of (laboratory) experiments on social preferences will be discussed as well. Apart from methodological critique, experimental studies that critically reflect on prominent papers and research agendas will be presented in order to highlight the relevance of apparent subtleties in experimental design.

Literature:
The course literature consists of a list of journal articles. Some key articles are below, further literature will be announced during the course.

Andreoni, James (1995). Cooperation in Public Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion? American Economic Review 85(4), 891-904.
Andreoni, James and John H. Miller (2002). Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism. Econometrica 70(2), 737-753.
Bénabou, Roland and Jean Tirole (2006). Incentives and prosocial behavior. American Economic Review 96(5). 1652-1678.
Blanco, Mariana, Dirk Engelmann, and Hans-Theo Normann (2011). A Within-Subject Analysis of Other-Regarding Preferences. Games and Economic Behavior 72(2), 321-338.
Bolton, Gary E. and Axel Ockenfels (2000). ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity and Competition. American Economic Review 90(1), 166-193.
Dufwenberg, Martin, Paul Heidhues, Georg Kirchsteiger, Frank Riedel, and Joel Sobel (2011). Other-Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium. Review of Economic Studies 78(2), 613-639.
Engelmann, Dirk and Martin Strobel (2004). Inequality Aversion, Effciency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments. American Economic Review 94(4), 857-869.
Fehr, Ernst and Simon Gächter (2000). Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments. American Economic Review 90(4), 980-994.
Fehr, Ernst and Klaus M. Schmidt (1999). A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(3), 817-868.
Levitt, Steven D. and List, John A. (2007). What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal About the Real World? Journal of Economic Perspectives 21(2), 153-174.
Nikiforakis, Nikos, 2008. Punishment and Counter-punishment in Public Good Games: Can we Really Govern Ourselves? Journal of Public Economics 92(1-2), 91-112.

Early relevant surveys are provided in:
Camerer, Colin F. (2003). Behavioral Game Theory, Princeton University Press. Chapter 2
Ledyard, John (1995): Public Goods: A Survey of Experiment Research. In: John H. Kagel and Alvin E. Roth, Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press.

Exam:
written exam

Credits:
6.00
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Instructor:
Friday,
02:00pm to 04:00pm
at tba
Monday,
10:00am to 12:00pm
at tba
Description:

The Economics of Climate Policy is an introductory course into the economics of climate change mitigation and adaptation policies. Essentially, the mitigation of climate change is a global public good, posing policy challenges both at the national level (within countries) as well as at the international level (between countries). In the course, concepts such as market failures, externalities, and Pigouvian taxes are developed and applied to climate change. Game theory will be introduced to understand the challenges in international climate negotiations. The history and status quo of international negotiations will be reviewed, as well as implementation policies such as the EU ETS and Germany’s Energiewende. Since these concepts can be applied to many public policy problems, the course is also an introduction into allocation theory, environmental economics, public finance and game theory.

Topics:
Starting from the perspective of decentralized decision making and coordination, we provide a systematic overview of the relevant issues in climate change policy. This includes, inter alia:

  • Climate change as a market failure: externalities and public goods, internalization options such as Pigouvian tax and cap and trade systems (prices vs. quantities), policy instrument design
  • Game theory, behavioral economics and Elinor Ostrom’s approaches to governing commons
  • The international politics of climate change: the history and status quo of UNFCCC climate negotiations from Rio to Kyoto and Paris, incentives for countries to reduce emissions: co-benefits, double dividend, and climate agreements
  • Climate policies today: The European Union Emission Trading scheme (EU ETS), Germany’s Energiewende, and the U.S. EPA Clean Power Plan

Literature:

Obligatory readings (along with the course)

  • Perman et al.: Natural Resource and Environmental Economics, Pearson.
  • Stern Review, part IV – VI
  • IPCC AR5 WG III, chapters 13-15
  • Edenhofer et al.: The Atmosphere as a Global Common - Challenges for International Cooperation and Governance, Handbook of the Macroeconomics of Global Warming
  • A number of specific articles will be distributed during the semester. Students are expected to read about one paper per week.

Recommended readings (to prepare for the course)

  • Fudenberg & Tirole: Game theory, MIT Press.
  • The timeline of UNFCCC climate negotiations.

Exam:

Students will be graded based on weekly problem sets (homework assignments) and a written mid-term exam. There is no final exam. Ph.D. students will be asked to take an oral exam in addition to the assignments and the mid-term exam.

Credits:
6.00
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